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THE NEXT STEP IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY: APPLYING THE
WARRANTY TO CONDOMINIUMS
ChristopherS. Brennan*
INTRODUCTION

Three residential buildings are located side-by-side on the same
street. A landlord owns the first building and tenants occupy its units.
The second building is a cooperative, occupied by cooperative owners.
The third building is a condominium, occupied by condominium owners. By coincidence, the water heaters in each of the three buildings
burst at the same time, and the landlord and management agents fail
to take corrective action. As a result, the occupants of all three buildings have no hot water for a month. In many jurisdictions throughout
the United States, the tenants of the first building, along with the cooperative owners of the second building, have the unwaivable action
or defense of an implied warranty of habitability.' This doctrine allows for rent or maintenance fee abatements in response to habitability-threatening defects. The implied warranty of habitability would
not be available,
however, to the condominium owners of the third
2
building.
The disparity in remedies available to tenants, cooperative owners,
and condominium owners illustrated above is a result of reluctance by
some courts to extend the implied warranty of habitability to condominium owners. While it is settled that purchasers of condominium
units have the warranty of habitability available to them against their
sellers for defects present at the time of purchase,3 this Note focuses
on the warranty as a remedy against a condominium's board of direc* This Note is dedicated to my wife, Lisa, without whom none of this would be
possible. I would also like to thank Professor Michael Madison of Fordham Univer-

sity School of Law for inspiring the topic.
1. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970)

(holding that "the tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's
performance of his obligations, including his warranty to maintain the premises in
habitable condition"); Richard Siegler, An Update on the Warranty of Habitability,
N.Y. L.J., July 1, 1998, at 3 ("In the 23 years since [New York's warranty of habitability] was enacted, courts have repeatedly held it applicable to co-op apartments.").
2. See, e.g., Agassiz W. Condominium Ass'n v. Solum, 527 N.W.2d 244,247 (N.D.

1995) (indicating that "individual [condominium] unit owners may not withhold payment of common charges and assessments, because of disagreements over repairs to
common areas").
3. See Kathleen McNamara Tomcho, Note, Commercial Real Estate Buyer Beware: Sellers May Have the Right to Remain Silent, 70 S. Cal. L Rev. 1571, 1572

(1997) ("[Claveat emptor has been effectively abolished in residential real property
transactions."); see also Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985) (holding that
the seller of real property has a duty to inform the purchaser of any defects); Posner v.
Davis, 395 N.E.2d 133, 137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (same); Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d
885, 888 (W. Va. 1982) (same).
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tors for habitability-threatening defects that arise in the condominium's common areas during a resident's ownership and occupancy of
his unit.4
It may be enticing to dismiss this controversy by stating the obvious:
because condominium owners hold deeds while tenants and cooperative owners hold leases, the estates' disparate legal compositions explain why statutes dealing with the implied warranty of habitability do
not encompass condominiums.5 Such a quick dismissal based on the
statutory "letter of the law," however, does not take into account the
evolution of the implied warranty of habitability and the engines that
drove this evolution. This Note proposes that extending the implied
warranty of habitability to condominiums is in line with the doctrine's
common law development.
Part I of this Note examines the relative legal position that tenants,
cooperative owners, and condominium unit owners possess in reference to their landlords and boards of directors. This part also discusses the similarities between these three forms of habitation.- Part II
evaluates the development of the implied warranty of habitability
from its common law birth to its codification, and finally to its application to cooperatives. Part III analyzes the arguments against the extension of the statutory warranty to condominiums. This part
demonstrates that the same equitable considerations that created an
implied warranty of habitability for renters and cooperative owners
demand that the common law doctrine be extended to condominiums.
This Note concludes that the next logical step in the evolution of the
implied warranty of habitability is to apply the doctrine to
condominiums.
I.

THE LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF TENANTS, COOPERATIVE OWNERS,
AND CONDOMINIUM UNIT OWNERS

This part analyzes the legal structures of the relationships between
landlords and tenants, boards of directors and cooperative owners,
and boards of directors and condominium unit owners. The analysis
illustrates that tenants, cooperative owners, and condominium unit
owners share a similar dependency: all rely upon their landlords or
boards of directors to maintain the common elements that effect the
habitability of their units.

4. More specifically, this Note focuses on the habitability-threatening defects that
arise in the areas over which the board of directors generally retains control.
5. See, e.g., Frisch v. Bellmarc Management, Inc., 597 N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (App.

Div. 1993) ("[T]he two forms of interest in real property are fundamentally different
by design and as a matter of law.").
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A. The Legal Structures
1. Landlord-Tenant Relationship
In the early Middle Ages, the tenant was not considered to be an
owner of an interest in land.6 In fact, the tenant was "one who had no
right in the land, but merely the benefit of a contract." 7 As time
progressed, however, the tenant gradually gained more possessory
rights in the land, and the lease was eventually considered more a conveyance than a contract. 8
The hybrid nature of the lease as both a contract and a conveyance
has led some states to view the lease as personal property and other
states to view it as real property. 9 The classification of a tenant's
property interest is important. If the tenant is viewed as an owner of
real property, then the same statutory requirements that apply to an
owner in fee apply to the tenant. 10
Regardless of how a tenant's property interest is classified, all jurisdictions now view the focus of a residential lease to be shelter, not
land.1 In addition, most jurisdictions recognize that whether or not a
tenant is considered an owner of real property, he relies exclusively on
his landlord to maintain the common elements that bear on the es-2
sence of his property interest: the habitability of the leased housing.'
2. Board of Directors-Cooperative Owner Relationship
Cooperatives can be legally constructed in several ways. Since the
early part of the twentieth century, the corporation has been the most
widely used form to create cooperatives.' The corporate form has
become the most popular method primarily due its flexibility.1 4 It allows the owners to retain control over the management of the property and minimizes the owners' liability exposure.' Another possible
6. See 2 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, Powell on Real Property

§ 16.02[l][a] (1998).

7. Id. (quoting 2 Frederick Pollack & Frederick Maitland, History of English Law
36 (1895)).
8. See 6 Samuel Wiliston & Walter H. E. Jaeger, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 890 (3d ed. 1962).
9. See Powell & Rohan, supra note 6, § 16.02[2].

10. See id.
11. See id
12. Cf infra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the role of a managing

agent).
13. See Chester C. McCullough, Jr., Cooperative Apartments in Illinois, 26 Chi.-

Kent L. Rev. 303, 309 (1948) ("The corporate form of organization has been by far
the most popular in the co-operative housing movement.").
14. See id.

15. See Philip N. Smith, Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of Cooperative
Apartment Ownership, 16 U. Miami L. Rev. 305, 310 (1961) (identifying the disadvantage of the trust form as "the fact that its use either results in the relinquishment of
control by the members or, if the control is exercised, there is a risk of personal
liability").
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method of forming a cooperative is to issue a title in fee to the occupant of each housing unit. 1 6 Finally, the cooperative can originate in
the form of a trust.' 7 Under the trust structure, title to the property is
"transferred to a trustee who signs a declaration of trust and issues
certificates of beneficial interest entitling the holder to occupancy of
designated apartments."' 8 This section focuses on the corporate form
of cooperatives.
One who promotes the cooperative venture must take the necessary
pre-incorporation measures, just as he would if he were forming an
ordinary corporation. One of these measures usually includes the acquisition of the land and building that will constitute the cooperative,
which almost always requires the corporation to take out a mortgage. 19 Once the corporation is formed and shares are issued, prospective apartment owners buy blocks of shares commensurate to the
value of the unit they plan to occupy. 20 Therefore, a cooperative
owner does not own the space within his unit. For the owner to take
legal possession of his particular unit, the corporation issues a proprietary lease. The stock certificate and the proprietary lease, held in
conjunction, are viewed as a "unitary, indivisible whole not subject to
separate ownership."2 2 While banks issue loans to owners for the
purchase of stock, rather than for the purchase of individual units, the
loan is almost always secured with an interest in the owner's proprietary lease for a specific unit.'
All cooperative owners pay what is usually termed a maintenance
fee. 4 In a cooperative, only part of this monthly fee is for the cost of
maintaining the common areas. The other part of the fee enables the

16. See 1 American Law of Property § 3.10 (Casner ed. 1952) (discussing the possible legal structures of a cooperative).
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Cf. Nina J. Crimm, Should Internal Revenue Code Section 277 Be Applied to
Cooperative Housing Organizations?,7 Akron Tax J. 87, 91 (1990) (indicating that,
while promoters secure the underlying mortgage, cooperative shareholders enjoy the
benefit of an income tax deduction commensurate to the portion of the underlying
mortgage interst that is allocable to their units).
20. See 1 American Law of Property, supra note 16, § 3.10 ("Shares of stock ...
are sold to persons who will occupy the housing units, the number of shares ... depending on the value of the particular.., unit.").
21. See id.; see also, e.g., C.G.J. Corp. v. Hurwitz, 123 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1960) (discussing the validity of a 99-year proprietary lease).
22. Mark S. Rosen, Residential Housing Cooperatives-A Legal Perspective, N.J.
Law., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 14, 14.
23. Mortgages of individual cooperative owners are usually secured by filing a lien
in accordance with the state's Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. § 91040) (McKinney 1990) (explaining the procedure to perfect a security interest in a
cooperative).
24. See Co-op and Condo Ownership 6 (Vicki Chesler ed., 1995).
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corporation to pay its own real property taxes2 and underlying mortgage.2 In essence, then, the cooperative shareholder has double
mortgage exposure: liability for the mortgage used to purchase his
shares (as a shareholder) and for the corporation's underlying mortgage. As with a shareholder of any corporation, a cooperative owner
runs the risk of losing his entire investment if the cooperative becomes
insolvent. 7 In such a situation, creditors foreclose on the real property owned by the corporation, and the proprietary lease becomes
invalid. 8
Cooperative owners are subject to by-laws and the terms of their
proprietary leases. 9 The by-laws normally provide that a board of
directors will govern the cooperative.3 0 The cooperative board of directors has a substantial voice in determining who may become a
shareholder. In fact, a cooperative board "can refuse to allow a resident to sell his or her unit to a particular buyer 'for any reason or no
reason,' as long as their decision is not based on illegal
discrimination."31
Managing agents usually handle the day-to-day operations of cooperatives, including all back-office operations, upkeep of the common
elements, maintenance of building systems, and the hiring of specialists to make emergency repairs. 2 Nonetheless, the ultimate responsibility for the fitness of the common elements that bear on the
habitability of each unit rests with the board of directors. 3
3.

Board of Directors-Condominium Unit Owner Relationship

All condominiums share a basic legal definition. Each unit of the
condominium is owned separately, and the owner of each unit holds a
25. Since a cooperative owner does not have a deed to his individual unit, the

specific unit is not taxed. Rather, the entire real property of the cooperative is assessed, and the corporation pays this real property tax. See id. at 5.

26. See 1 American Law of Property, supra note 16, § 3.10 (stating that the maintenance fee "is based upon estimates of amounts necessary to pay operational costs
and interest and installments of principal on any capital indebtedness"). The fact that
the corporation, and not the individual owners (as with a condominium), pays the real
property taxes and underlying mortgage on the real property makes the cooperative

owner's maintenance fee more costly than that of a condominium owner.
27. See Schaffer v. Eighty-One Hundred Jefferson Ave. E. Corp., 255 N.W. 324,
327 (Mich. 1934) (explaining that cooperative shareholders share the same risks as
shareholders in any other corporation and "must submit to the burdens as well as
enjoy the benefits which inhere in the plan they adopt").

28. See idL
(indicating that shareholders "are not necessary parties to the foreclosure suit").
29. See Smith, supra note 15, at 311-12 (discussing by-laws).
30. Cf infra Part I.A.3 (detailing how a condominium is governed).
31. Co-op and Condo Ownership, supra note 24, at 6.

32. See id. at 5-6.
33. Cf infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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deed to that specific unit.3" All of the unit owners have an undivided
co-ownership of the common property outside of the separately
owned units,3 5 and when an individual unit is sold, the appurtenant
share of the common elements adhere to the unit. 36 Thus, a condominium unit owner has a deed to the area within his unit and ownership interest in the deed to the condominium's common elements.37 If
the owner requires a loan to purchase the condominium unit, then the
owner mortgages that specific unit.3 8 Each unit owner is personally
39
responsible for paying the real estate tax assessed on his unit only.
Maintenance or association fees are paid by each of the unit owners
for the maintenance of the common elements. Furthermore, the condominium statute of each state usually requires owners to comply with
the declarations, by-laws, and administrative rules of the
condominium.40
Just as with a cooperative, a board of directors normally governs the
condominium."1 The directors usually volunteer their services 42 and
are elected to the board by the other unit owners.4 3 Also, as cooperative boards do, condominium boards of directors regularly hire
outside managing agents, who are responsible for handling the day-today operations of the condominium.4" In fact, it is not uncommon for
both condominiums and cooperatives to employ the same managing
agent. The managing agent's responsibilities to a condominium parallel its responsibilities to a cooperative. 45 While a management contract can delegate a great deal of authority to the managing agent, the
34. See Wayne S. Hyatt, Condominium and Homeowner Association Practice:
Community Association Law 14-15 (1988).
35. It is important to emphasize that in a condominium, the common elements are

not owned by the association board, but rather by the owners of the individual units
themselves. If the common elements have been deeded to the association, then co-

ownership no longer exists, and the development is not a condominium. See, e.g.,
Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp., 405 P.2d 432, 433 (Mont. 1965) (discussing the
legal composition of a horizontal property apartment building).
36. See Robert G. Natelson, Condominiums, Reform, and the Unit Ownership Act,
58 Mont. L. Rev. 495, 499 (1997).
37. See Co-op and Condo Ownership, supra note 24, at 6 ("[A] condo owner actually buys a piece of real estate-an apartment.... The common space and fixtures of
the building are jointly owned by the unit owners according to the size and value of
their apartments as each owner's 'common interest allocation."').

38. See id. ("Each owner may take out a mortgage to buy an individual unit.").
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., Natelson, supra note 36, at 507 (discussing the Montana Unit Ownership Act).
41. See Co-op and Condo Ownership, supra note 24, at 6.
42. See id. at 5 (stating that "[the] boards of . . . condos are made up of
volunteers").
43. See id. at 6 (explaining that "condos are also run by elected boards").

44. See id. at 5-6.
45. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The standard contract with a managing agent spans from one to three years. See Co-op and Condo Ownership, supra
note 24, at 5-6.
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board of directors is ultimately liable for ensuring that the condominium is run properly.4 6

The sale of a condominium unit is similar to the sale of a house,
with one exception: the condominium's board of directors has the

right of first refusal.47 This means that if the board of directors objects

to the sale of the unit, it has the right to purchase the unit itseffs As9

a practical matter, boards rarely exercise their right of first refusal.4
Nevertheless, this board approval process is one of many fundamental
similarities between condominiums and cooperatives.
B.

Cooperative/Condominium Similarities

Courts often interchange the legal concepts of condominiums and
cooperatives,50 because the two forms of property ownership are very
similar. 51 Both were created to deal with shortages of land and
skyrocketing homeownership costs. 52 Both condominium and cooper53
ative owners jointly own the common areas of their real property,
and the habitability of each unit depends upon the proper maintenance of these common areas. Moreover, condominium and cooperative owners elect a board of directors composed of volunteers5 4 The
success of both the condominium and the cooperative depends greatly
on the competency of their respective boards and the proper selection
of a managing agent to run day-to-day operations.55
One may point to cooperative owners' potential liability for two
mortgages as a significant difference between cooperatives and condo46. Any authority that the managing agent possesses is derived from the agency
relationship between the board as "master" and the managing company as "agent"
established in the contract.
47. See Co-op and Condo Ownership, supra note 24, at 6.
48. See id

49. See id. at 5-6.
50. See, e.g., Harrison Park Owners v. Dixon, 604 A.2d 165, 168 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992) ("Recent cases and statutory enactments tend to blur the distinction
between co-operatives and condominiums." (citations omitted)).
51. A cooperative owner, like a condominium owner,
is more than a mere tenant or lessee. She has certain proprietary rights
which a mere tenant does not have. She has most of the attributes of an
owner. She has a voice in the management and operation of a building....
She has a voice, too, in the important matter of any proposed sale or mortgage of the property. More important, she has the exclusive, personal right
to occupy her particular apartment.
Hicks v. Bigelow, 55 A.2d 924, 926 (D.C. 1947).
52. See Keith B. Romney & Brad Romney, Condominium Development Guide 14 (revised ed. 1983) (observing that the condominium concept was created to address
the lack of land in ancient Rome for residential construction); Note, Co-operative
Apartment Housing, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1407, 1407 (1948) (indicating that cooperative
apartments gained popularity in urban areas following World War I due to a shortage
of affordable residential housing).
53. See supra notes 20, 37 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 32, 44 and accompanying text.
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miniums. But this increased liability is eventually balanced out, because "the purchase price of a condo[minium] is generally higher than
that of a comparable co-op[erative], for this reason. Taking all things
56
into account, the ownership costs are approximately the same.
Financial considerations, more than legal considerations, will often
determine whether a condominium or a cooperative is created. 57 The
promoter will analyze the economic climate and determine which
form is more feasible at that particular time in that particular jurisdiction.58 Promoters view condominium and cooperative ownership as
two available means to the same end: community homeownership.59
In short, tenancies, condominiums, and cooperatives are not exactly
distinct breeds, but rather closely related hybrids. Indeed, all three
are reliant on one form of management or another to ensure the
"community" aspect of their home is maintained properly. This similarity is important to keep in mind when analyzing the development of
the implied warranty of habitability, as discussed below in part II.
Specifically, part II details the process by which courts, and later state
legislatures, created and refined the warranty to meet the needs of a
changing society.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY

OF HABITABILITY

The emergence of the implied warranty of habitability at common

law has been called "revolutionary," 6 while the court opinions that
ignited this revolution have been described as "doctrinal flagship[s]."
61 The warranty merits such accolades primarily because it usurped
56. Co-op and Condo Ownership, supra note 24, at 6.

57. In his article, Mark S. Rosen lists the following financial reasons for a sponsor's decision to create a cooperative instead of a condominium:
1. The availability of underlying blanket mortgage financing at terms better

than those for condominium-end loans for individual purchasers;
2. The future ability of the cooperative to mortgage the real estate to avoid
large special assessments for capital repairs;
3. Better economic leverage for the individual homeowner in purchasing

and financing their unit;
4. The ability of other cooperative owners to conduct a credit review to

ensure the financial capabilities of unit purchasers to pay maintenance fees;
5. The ability of the sponsor to retire debt more quickly and, therefore, accelerate the reduction of its economic risks;

6. Lower real estate tax assessments;
7. Favorable income tax treatment for the owner of a rental complex seeking to convert.
Rosen, supra note 22, at 17.

58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Symposium, Edited Transcript of Proceedings of the Liberty Fund, Inc. Seminar on the Common Law History of Landlord-Tenant Law, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 623,
648 (1984).
61. Id. at 647.
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ancient property concepts that had become entrenched in the English
and American legal systems over hundreds of years.
The implied warranty of habitability applies to the landlord-tenant
relationship during two different stages.62 At one stage, it applies to
"commencement defects"-defects present on the premises at the
time the parties enter into the lease agreement.63 At the next stage,
the implied warranty of habitability applies to "post-commencement
defects"-defects that develop on the premises after the start of the
lease term.64 While the two stages are related, they developed separately and distinctly. This part looks at the development of the two
stages, the codification of the warranty doctrine, and its eventual application to cooperatives.
A.

The Common Law Birth of the Implied Warranty
of Habitability

Before the development of the implied warranty of habitability, a
fundamental premise in common law was that, "in the absence of
some agreement, there is no obligation upon a landlord to make repairs upon leased property or to keep it in a safe condition."6 5 The
reason for this doctrine was twofold. First, in medieval times, the bargained-for expectation of the tenant was the use of the land itself.'
Any structures on the land were usually easy to inspect, and courts
assumed that the tenant had the skill to make any necessary repairs.67
Second, earlier courts held that the tenant more properly bore the
burden of initial inspection of the home and subsequent repairs, because any structure on the land was considered an inconsequential
part of the tenant's consideration.' This "no repair" doctrine shares a
common history with caveat emptor, the doctrine generally applicable
to commencement defects. Beginning in the Middle Ages, English
courts applied both doctrines to the conveyance of real property;
62. See Hiram H. Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1279,

1285 (1960) (observing that two separate and distinct questions arise "with reference
to physical condition of the [leased] premises").

63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 1285.
See id. at 1286.
Chambers v. Lowe, 169 A. 912, 914 (Conn. 1933) (citations omitted).
See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970)

(indicating that in the Middle Ages "the land was more important than whatever
small living structure was included [on the land]" (citation omitted)); Pugh v. Holmes,
384 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) ("Because the focal point of early landlordtenant relationships was the land itself, little attention was paid to the dwelling situated on the land.").
67. See Pugh, 384 A.2d at 1238 (emphasizing that "[ijt was assumed ... that the

agrarian tenant had the ability ... to make simple repairs in the buildings").

68. But see Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077 n.33 (discussing the common law's deviation
from the general rule in situations where a tenant's paramount consideration was, in
fact, the housing itself, such as when the tenant was a guest of an inn).
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American courts adopted this approach in the seventeenth century. 69
Between caveat emptor and the "no repair" doctrine, the general rule
was that the landlord was completely insulated from liability at all
stages of the tenancy.70
The "no repair" doctrine was even more formidable when combined with an equally entrenched common law contract principle: the
doctrine of "independent covenants."' 7 1 This doctrine mandated that
even if the landlord covenanted to keep the leased premises in good
repair, his covenant was independent of the tenant's covenant to pay
rent.72 Thus, the tenant was prohibited from withholding performance (i.e., paying rent) even if the landlord breached any promise he
had made to complete needed repairs.73 Once again, these courts reasoned that any additional covenants in the lease made by the landlord
were "merely incidental" to his main covenant of land conveyance. 74
Therefore, as long as the landlord conveyed the land, the tenant had
received his primary bargained-for consideration, obligating
him to
provide the landlord's primary consideration-the rent.75
The medieval doctrines of "no repair" and independent covenants
entered the twentieth century well-intact in the United States.7 6 But
their foundation began to erode as their common law sibling, caveat
emptor, came under heavy attack. In 1892, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in Ingalls v. Hobbs,77 was the first United
States court to imply an initial warranty of habitability into a shortterm lease for furnished premises.78 In Ingalls, a renter of a summer
cottage sued her landlord to recover her $500 rental payment, claiming that the cottage was uninhabitable because it was infested with
bugs. 79 The court agreed with the renter and permitted recovery, explaining that "[i]t would be unreasonable to hold, under such circum69. See Jean C. Love, Landlord'sLiability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee,
Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 19, 22 (discussing how American
courts accepted caveat emptor as part of the common law of England).

70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71. See Williston & Jaegar, supra note 8, § 890 (explaining that the doctrine of

independent covenants was settled prior to the development of the contract principle
of mutual dependency).
72. See 1 American Law of Property, supra note 16, § 3.11 ("[T]he covenants are
assumed to be independent.").
73. See Stone v. Sullivan, 15 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Mass. 1938) ("[Tlhe lessee's covenant to pay rent and the lessor's covenant or agreement to make 'outside repairs'...
were independent.").
74. See 1 American Law of Property, supra note 16, § 3.11.

75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Chambers v. Lowe, 169 A. 912, 914 (Conn. 1933) (applying the doctrine of "no repair"); Stone, 15 N.E.2d at 479 (applying the doctrine of independent

covenants).
77. 31 N.E. 286 (Mass. 1892).
78. See Fred William Bopp III, Note, The UnwarrantedImplication of a Warranty
of Fitness in Commercial Leases-An Alternative Approach, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 1057,
1063 n.42 (1988).
79. See Ingalls, 31 N.E. at 286.
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stances, that the landlord does not impliedly agree that what he is
letting is a house suitable for occupation in its condition at the time." s
The court emphasized that the bargained-for expectations of the tenant, namely, "[the house's] fitness for immediate use of a particular
kind,.

. .

is a far more important element entering into the contract

than when there is a mere lease of real estate."81
Subsequent decisions expanded the scope of the Ingalls decision.
For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Delamater v. Foreman,8 permitted Ingalls's implied warranty of habitability to apply to
a lease for an unfurnished apartment.'m There, the plaintiffs claimed
that they were constructively evicted from their apartment because
the unit was infested with bedbugs.' 4 The court observed that "[t]here
is much in and about such an apartment building far beyond the control of a tenant in one of the apartments." s According to the court, if
tenants are invaded by a "verminous enemy" from areas outside their
control, then the landlord has violated his implied covenant that "the
premises will be habitable." 6
Following Ingalls and Delamater,numerous states began to adopt
statutes that imposed a duty on landlords to maintain leased premises
in habitable condition.s7 Many courts viewed these statutes as a legislative nod for them to imply that, at the outset of every lease, landss
lords warrant that the leased premises are in habitable condition.
This attack on caveat emptor came to a crescendo in the 1960s with the
0
cases of Pines v. Perssion8 9 and Brown v. Southall Realty Co."

In Pines, a group of students from the University of Wisconsin
leased a house on the condition that the landlord would put the premises in good repair by the start of the lease.91 The landlord did not
make the repairs and, in addition to the defects the students observed
upon their initial inspection, housing inspectors later discovered that
the plumbing, heating, and wiring systems were also defective.' In
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
239 N.W. 148 (Minn. 1931).
See id at 149.
See id
Id.
Id.

87. For examples of such statutes, see Lesar, supra note 62, at 1286 nA6.
88. See, e.g., Chambers v. Lowe, 169 A. 912, 913 (Conn. 1933) (applying a statute
that stated "each building used as a tenement, lodging or boarding house and all parts
thereof shall be kept in good repair"); Palmi iai v. D'Argenio, 125 N.E. 592, 592
(Mass. 1920) (applying a statute that stated "[elvery structure and part thereof and
appurtenant thereto shall be maintained in such repair as not to be dangerous"); Annis v. Britton, 205 N.W. 128, 129 (Mich. 1925) (using a statute that declared -[e]very
dwelling and all parts thereof shall be kept in good repair by the owner").
89. 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961).
90. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968).
91. See Pines, 111 N.W.2d at 410.
92. See id. at 413.
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Brown, the landlord sued to evict tenants who refused to pay their
rent when housing inspectors found "an obstructed commode, a broken railing and insufficient ceiling height in the basement." 93 In both
Pines and Brown, the tenants argued that even though the defects
were present at the start of their leases, they were nonetheless entitled
to withhold their rental payments because the defects violated local
housing codes and rendered their units uninhabitable.94 Both courts
determined that the lease agreements were void because the condition
of the rental units violated the warranty of habitability, and found that
the doctrine of caveat emptor would not interfere with this conclusion.95 As the Pines court observed:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in
leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing standards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid
population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal clich6, caveat emptor. Permitting landlords to rent "turnbledown" houses is at least a contributing cause of such problems as
urban blight, juvenile delinquency
and high property taxes for con96
scientious landowners.

Pines and Brown came after nearly a century of courts tinkering
with the warranty of habitability's application to commencement defects. With the courts focusing on the modem tenant's bargained-for
expectations vis-A-vis caveat emptor, it appeared that it would only be
a matter of time before their focus shifted to the doctrines of "no repair" and independent covenants. Because the two applications are
distinct, however, the elimination of these post-commencement doctrines was not a foregone conclusion. Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit
made the leap between the two applications in Javins v. First National
Realty Corp.97

In Javins, tenants directly challenged the doctrines of "no repair"
and independent covenants. 98 The tenants claimed that they were entitled to withhold their rental payments due to the landlord's failure to
correct approximately 1500 housing code violations that arose on the
93. Brown, 237 A.2d at 836.
94. See id. ("[P]rior to the signing of the lease agreement, [the tenant] was on
notice that certain Housing Code violations existed on the premises in question.");
Pines, 111 N.W.2d at 413 ("There is no question in this case but that the house was
not in a condition reasonably and decently fit for occupation when the lease term
commenced.").
95. See Brown, 237 A.2d at 837 ("'[T]he general rule is that an illegal contract...
is void and confers no right upon the wrongdoer."' (quoting Hartman v. Lubar, 133
F.2d 44, 45 (1942)); Pines, 111 N.W.2d at 413 ("Since there was a failure of consideration, [the tenants] are absolved from any liability for rent.").
96. Pines, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
97. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
98. See id. at 1073.
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premises after the commencement of their lease terms.99 In considering this claim, the court first emphasized that, in the case of the "modem apartment dweller,"'"m the value of the lease is not in the land
itself, but in the habitability of the housing structure.10 1 Next, the
court surveyed the current case law and acknowledged the reluctance

of other courts to extend the implied warranty of habitability beyond
commencement defects to include post-commencement defects as
well."ca But the court found this authority to be non-persuasive, emphasizing that "[c]ourts have a duty to reappraise old doctrines in the
light of the facts and values of contemporary life-particularly old
common law doctrines which the courts themselves created and developed."'1 3 Additionally, the court, in echoing Pines and Brown, observed that "inequality in bargaining power between landlord and

tenant... mean[s] that landlords place tenants in a take it or leave it
situation."' ' Thus, according to the court, a standardized lease does
not reflect all of the tenant's bargained-for expectations.105 Finally,
the court examined the adverse impact that the doctrines of "no repair" and "independent covenants" had on the social policies advanced by state statutes requiring landlords to meet a minimum
standard of habitability. 106
With these considerations in mind, the court extended the warranty
of habitability to post-commencement defects. 10 7 The court observed
that "by signing the lease the landlord has undertaken a continuing
99. See id at 1072 ("These cases present the question whether housing code viola-

tions which arise during the term of a lease have any effect upon the tenant's obligation to pay rent." (citation omitted)).
100. Id. at 1074.
101. See i ("When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they seek a well known package of goods and services-a package which includes
not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable
plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance." (citation omitted)).
102. See id. at 1076 ("Recent decisions have offered no convincing explanation for
their refusal; rather they have relied without discussion upon the old common law
rule that the lessor is not obligated to repair...." (citation omitted)). Prior to Javins,
courts often applied state statutes requiring landlords to maintain leased premises in
good repair under the penalty of law. See supra note 87. But the statutes did not
explicitly indicate that the landlord warranted the habitability of the premises to the
tenant. Most courts were reluctant to subject landlords to punishment under the provisions of these statutes while simultaneously providing tenants with a viable action or
defense against the landlord. See, eg., Kearse v. Spaulding, 176 Aid 450, 451 (Pa.
1962) (arguing that if the legislature intended to create this remedy for tenants it
would have done so explicitly).
103. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074 (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 1079 (citations omitted).
105. See id. at 1079-80.
106. See id at 1082 ("To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability
in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent wvith the current legislative policy concerning housing standards." (quoting Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (Wis.
1961))).
107. See id.

3054

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

obligation to the tenant to maintain the premises.' 10 8 The court ap-

plied contract principles' 0 9 to the lease agreement and concluded that

the landlord's proper maintenance of the leased premises was a condition precedent to the tenant's performance of paying rent." 0
Javins was quickly"' followed by decisions throughout the United
States that extended the implied warranty of habitability to post-commencement defects."'

Javins and its legacy used common law to ef-

fectively destroy the doctrines of "no repair" and independent
covenants. 113 The decision's blustering momentum motivated state
legislatures to consider further insulating their social policies by codifying the implied warranty of habitability.
B.

Codification of the Implied Warranty of Habitability

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
sought to eliminate state courts' reluctance to provide tenants with the
warranty remedy." 4 Therefore, in 1972, when the Commissioners
adopted the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
("URLTA")," 5 it contained section 2.104, which "clearly states the
principles of the implied warranty
of habitability" without specifically
16
mentioning the warranty itself.
The Commissioners' intent was to fuse the warranty of habitability
as it existed in the case law of numerous jurisdictions" 7 with the statutory obligations that had been imposed on landlords for nearly a cen108. Id. at 1081 (emphasis added).
109. Although Javins has been praised by many scholars for infusing contract law
into antiquated property law, the fact of the matter is that "[ojriginally the lessee's
rights were purely contractual." 1 American Law of Property, supra note 16, § 3.11.
So, in essence, Javins simply brought landlord-tenant common law full circle.
110. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082 ("Under contract principles, however, the tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's performance of his obligations,
including his warranty to maintain the premises in habitable condition." (footnote
omitted)).
111. Within two weeks after the Javins decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 532-34 (N.J. 1970), recognized a warranty of habitability in residential leases.
112. See Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords,
81 Mich. L. Rev. 99, 111 (1982) (indicating that the Javins decision became the model
used by courts looking to apply the implied warranty of habitability).
113. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17, 21 (N.J. 1973) (holding that a tenant's obligation to pay rent and a landlord's warranty of habitability are mutually
dependent).
114. See Charles H. Pullen, Note, From "Tumble-Down Houses" to Safe Housing:
The Decline of Tort Immunity for Landlords, 12 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 343, 347 (1988)
(discussing the Commissioners' actions pertaining to the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act).
115. Unif. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 7B U.L.A. 430 (amended 1974).
116. Pullen, supra note 114, at 347.
117. See id. at 346-47.
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tury.11s The results of their efforts were well-defined guidelines for
landlords. Section 2.104 begins with the broad generalization that a
landlord "shall make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put
and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition."'1 9 It then
defines the maintenance of habitability by indicating that a landlord
"shall maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and
other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him."' 2 URLTA failed, however, to explicitly state that a warranty of habitability is implied in every residential
lease. Nevertheless, most courts understood that the Commissioners
intended to do just that.' 2 ' The result was that a total of twenty-three
states adopted URLTA by statute in one form or another.1'2 Moreover, the rhetoric of the Javins decision motivated numerous state legislatures to explicitly spell out that the warranty of habitability was an
unwaivable aspect of every residential lease. For example, title 9, section 4457 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated sets forth that '[i]n any
residential rental agreement, the landlord shall be deemed to covenant and warrant to deliver over and maintain, throughout the period
of the tenancy, premises that are safe, clean and fit for human habitation."''
In addition, New York Real Property Law section 235-b
states, in part, that "the landlord or lessor shall be deemed to...
warrant that.

.

. [tenants] shall not be subjected to any conditions

118. This seems to follow the "normal" process of codification. See Ronald J. Allen,
The Explanatory Value of Analyzing Codificationsby Reference to Organizing Principles Other Than Those Employed in the Codification, 79 Nw. U. L Rev. 1080, 1080
(1984-1985) ("The process of codification normally proceeds by identifying the basic
concerns of the case law of the relevant area, supplemented, of course, by consideration of the contributions of any relevant statutes.").
119. Unif. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act § 2.104(a)(2), 7B U.LA. 460
(1985).
120. Id § 2.104(a)(4).
121. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Murphey, 640 P.2d 857, 860 (Ariz. 1982) (holding that the

specific duties listed within the Arizona statute, which was modeled after URLTA,
define the warranty of habitability); Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Mo.
1984) ("Habitability is to be measured by community standards, reflected in most
cases in local housing and property maintenance codes.").
122. See Alaska Stat. § 34.03.100 (Michie 1998); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1324
(West 1990 & Supp. 1998); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47a-7 (Vest 1994); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 25, § 5305 (Supp. 1998); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 83.51 (\Vest 1987 & Supp. 1999);
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 521-42 (Michie 1993); Iowa Code Ann. § 562A.15 (West
1992); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-2553 (1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 383.595 (Michie Supp.
1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 70-24-303 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. §76-1419 (1996); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 47-8-20 (Michie 1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-42 (1990 & Supp. 1997); N.D.
Cent. Code § 47-16-13.1 (1978); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5321.04 (Vest 1989 & Supp.
1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, § 118 (West 1986); Or. Rev. Stat. § 90.320 (1990); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 34-18-22 (1995); S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-440 (Law. Co-op. 1991); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 66-28-304 (1993 & Supp. 1997); Va. Code Ann. § 55-248.13 (Michie
1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 59.18.060 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999); W. Va. Code
§ 37-6-30 (1997).

123. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9,§ 4457(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
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which would be dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to their life,
health or safety.

' 12 4

Many states that adopted an explicit warranty of

habitability, however, have a much less detailed statutory definition of
the warranty itself, preferring to rely on their rich history of case law
to fill the gap."

The American courts, beginning with Ingalls and culminating with
the Javins legacy, created the implied warranty of habitability through
innovative and necessary case law. State legislatures could not ignore
the need for the law to mature as the realities of society changed. The
momentum that the case law created for the implied warranty of habitability resulted in 26
it being codified in most states and settled law in
almost every state.

C. Application of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
to Cooperatives

Soon after states created a statutory warranty of habitability for
renter-tenants, courts were asked to determine whether these statutes
applied to cooperative owners. 2 7 The few courts that have directly

addressed this issue focus on the relationship between the cooperative
and its shareholders. 28 This section first looks at cases that have considered the board of directors-shareholder relationship analogous,
under certain circumstances, to a landlord-tenant relationship. Next,
this section examines cases that have extended the statutory warranty
of habitability to cooperative owners.
1. Comparison of Cooperative Shareholders to Tenants
When not directly faced with the issue of whether the warranty of

habitability should apply to cooperative shareholders, courts have
generally accepted the proposition that the relationship between co124. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b(1) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999).
125. See George M. Armstrong, Jr. & John C. LaMaster, The Implied Warranty of
Habitability: LouisianaInstitution, Common Law Innovation, 46 La. L. Rev. 195, 204
(1985) (discussing what New York courts define as a breach of the implied warranty
of habitability).
126. See Pullen, supra note 114, at 348 (observing that there is "an almost nationwide adoption of the implied warranty of habitability"). But see Krista L. Noonan &
Frederick M. Preator, Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: It Is Time to Bury
the Beast Known as Caveat Emptor, 33 Land & Water L. Rev. 329, 329 (1998) (explaining that neither the courts nor the legislature of Wyoming have adopted an implied warranty of habitability for tenants).
127. See, e.g., Hauptman v. 222 E. 80th St. Corp., 418 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729-30 (Civ. Ct.
1979) (discussing the applicability of the statutory warranty of habitability to cooperatives); 158th St. Riverside Drive Co. v. Launay, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 6, 1976, at 9 (Civ. Ct.
1976) (same).
128. See, e.g., Laight Coop. Corp. v. Kenny, 430 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (Civ. Ct. 1980)
(examining the relationship between the cooperative and its shareholders); Hauptman, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 729 (indicating that "at the outset.., the relationship between
an apartment cooperative and the various cooperators" should be determined).
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operative boards of directors and their shareholders could be favorably compared to a landlord-tenant relationship in particular
situations. 12 9 For example, some courts have held that because cooperative shareholders occupy their own units under a lease, the relationship between a cooperative and its shareholders is, in fact,
equivalent to the relationship between a landlord and his tenants.'"
In Green v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.,31 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a cooperative shareholder should not be treated as an
owner of realty, but instead as a holder of a leasehold interest (i.e.,
tenant). 132 The court observed that a corporate cooperative has access to all of the legal remedies available to a landlord and can terminate a proprietary lease based on a cooperative owner's
misconduct. 133 It upheld the board's claim against the cooperative
shareholder by rendering the shareholder's ownership interest valueless through the termination of his lease.'3 In doing so, the court
ignored the cooperative shareholder's ownership interest and relied
exclusively on landlord-tenant law: "The courts have recognized that
the relation is that of landlord and tenant in allowing the corporation
the usual remedies of a landlord against a tenant." 135 The court, however, did not address the warranty of habitability issue, limiting its
interpretation of a cooperative shareholder as a tenant to the specific
question of whether the cooperative has the right to terminate a proprietary lease due to a shareholder's misconduct.
Other courts have looked to their state legislatures for guidance on
how to define the role of the cooperative shareholder in certain situations. The New York Court of Appeals, in State Tar Commission v.
Shor,13 6 found that state banking laws were "persuasive" evidence of

legislative intent that "the stock certificate and proprietary lease of a
co-operative apartment corporation are to be treated under principles
governing personal property," rather than real property. 37 This clas129. But see United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-58 (1975) (holding
that, for the narrow purpose of interpreting the Federal Securities Acts, cooperative
units should be treated as realty, not leasehold estates held by tenants).

130. See, e.g., Sun Terrace Manor v. Municipal Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 307, 309-10
(Ct. App. 1973) (recognizing a landlord-tenant relationship with respect to the application of summary proceeding statutes); Hauptinan,418 N.Y.S.2d at 729 (same).
131. 194 A.2d 273 (Md. 1963).

132. See id at 277.
133. See id.
134. See id. The shareholder's ownership interest was rendered valueless because
shares in a cooperative are meaningless without their accompanying proprietary lease.
See Edward M. Ross, Condonminunz in California-The Verge of an Era, 36 S.Cal. L

Rev. 351, 352-53 (1963).
135. Green, 194 A.2d at 276 (citation omitted); see also Frank S. Sengstock & Mary
C. Sengstock, Homeownership: A Goal for All Americans, 46 J. Urb. Law. 313, 435,
443 (1969) (stating that the cooperative shareholder's "relationship to the property is

that of a lessee who has some control over his landlord's action").
136. 371 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1977).
137. Id at 526.
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sification moved the definition of a shareholder much closer to that of
a tenant, because the shareholder, like the tenant, is not considered an
owner of real property in New York.' 38 The court indicated that the
legislative intent behind New York's banking law would be undermined if the cooperative owner's interest were defined as that of a
real property owner in this specific context. 139 At the same time, however, the court limited its holding to cases involving the prioritization
of secured interests in cooperative shares under section 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 140 The court observed that because this case
dealt with banking laws, it could be distinguished from other nonbanking cases that generated
seemingly contradictory definitions of
141
cooperative shareholders.
In 1973, a California appellate court considered whether an "unlawful detainer" statute, originally designed for use by landlords against
"holdover" tenants, could be used by a cooperative's board of directors to evict a shareholder. 14 The court initially observed that for
such an action to be sustained, the relationship between the cooperative and the shareholder would have to be classified as a landlordtenant relationship. 43 After indicating that there was no California
case law on point, the court "turn[ed] to other authorities that have
considered the character of the relationship of a corporate cooperative with the shareholder-tenant.' 1 44 Relying on cases decided in
Maryland and New York, along with the opinions set forth in various
law review articles, the court concluded that the cooperative-shareholder relationship was equivalent to the landlord-tenant relationship. 45 The court, however, limited its holding to unlawful detainer
actions, and "express[ed] no opinion as to any other legal relationships that may exist between [the cooperative] and [its
shareholders]."146
138. See Powell & Rohan, supra note 6, § 16.02[2].
139. See Shor, 371 N.E.2d at 526-27.
140. See id. at 527 (discussing how secured interests in stock and a proprietary lease
of a cooperative should be handled like a security interest in chattel paper under
UCC § 9-305).
141. See id. ("Different policy reasons underlie those decisions, and those reasons
do not necessarily support or controvert their applicability to the problems at hand.").
142. Sun Terrace Manor v. Municipal Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 307, 308-09 (Ct. App.
1973).
143. See id. at 309.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 309-10 (citing Green v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 194 A.2d 273, 276
(Md. 1963); Brigham Park Co-Operative Apts., Sec. 4 v. Lieberman, 158 N.Y.S.2d
135, 136 (Civ. Ct. 1956); Herbert J. Friedman & James K. Herbert, Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 299, 309
(1962)).
146. Sun TerraceManor, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 310 n.4. No state high court has squarely
addressed the question of whether the statutory warranty of habitability applies to
cooperatives. Further, cases that address this issue at all are scarce; only New York
has a modest stable of cases. This is probably due to the fact that there are approxi-
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2. Extending the Statutory Warranty of Habitability to
Cooperatives
Once courts established that, under certain circumstances, the cooperative-shareholder relationship could be treated as a landlord-tenant
relationship, the question arose as to whether the statutory warranty
of habitability could be applied to cooperatives. From the late 1970s
to the early 1980s, several New York cases answered this question in
the affirmative. 47 In Hauptman v. 222 E. 80th St. Corp.,48 a share-

holder brought a cause of action against his cooperative for its failure
to repair the ceiling in his apartment. 149 Along with a breach of contract action, the shareholder claimed a violation of New York's statutory warranty of habitability. 50 The court declared that "[a]
stockholder in a cooperative does not own his own apartment, but
rents it from the cooperative corporation of which he owns shares."'51
As a result, the court found that the relationship between an apartment cooperative and the various cooperators could be favorably
compared to a landlord-tenant relationship.' 5 2 The court then analyzed New York's statutory warranty of habitability and concluded
nothing in the statute indicated "an intention by the legislature to exempt cooperatives from the ambit of the warranty."' 53 Ultimately, the
court held the board of directors responsible for making the necessary
repairs.5 4

mately 138,000 cooperative units in Manhattan alone. See Rachelle Garbarine, Troubled Co-op Building Coming Back as Condos, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1997, at B6.
147. See Suarez v. Rivercross Tenants' Corp., 438 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167 (App. Term
1981); Laight Coop. Corp. v. Kenny, 430 N.Y.S.2d 237,239 (Civ. Ct. 1980); Hauptman
v. 222 E. 80th St. Corp., 418 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (Civ. Ct. 1979). But see Penokie v.
Colonial Townhouses Coop., Inc., 366 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); 158th St.
Riverside Drive Co. v. Launay, N.Y. LJ.Apr. 6, 1976, at 9 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976).
In Penokie, a shareholder had sued his cooperative board of directors under Michigan's Landlord-Tenant Relationship Act to recover his membership fee after he had
moved out. See 366 N.W.2d at 32. The court concluded that since the shareholders
exercised a certain degree of management, they themselves were, in essence, landlords. See id at 35. Because the line between a cooperative shareholder's role as
landlord and tenant is often blurred, the court felt that it could not, in good faith,
extend Michigan's Landlord-Tenant Relationship Act to cooperatives and their shareholders. See id. The court refused to "rewrite" the "definitions" of cooperative and
shareholder "to create a landlord-tenant relationship" where one does not exist. Id.
Similarly, in Launay, the first New York court to face this issue rejected the idea of
applying the statutory warranty to cooperatives. As the court observed: "While [the
statutory warranty] refers to 'every written or oral lease ...for residential premises'
...it is clear that the conventional landlord-tenant relationship is contemplated....
[Therefore, the shareholder's] remedy lies elsewhere." Launay, N.Y. i.., Apr. 6,
1976, at 9 (emphasis added).
148. 418 N.Y.S.2d 728.
149. See id. at 729.
150. See id.
151. Id (citation omitted).
152. See id
153. Id at 730.
154. See id.
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The New York Civil Court followed the precedent it established in
Hauptmanin Laight Cooperative Corp. v. Kenny. 155 Kenny, a cooperative shareholder, withheld $4000 in maintenance fees, claiming faulty
construction work supervised by the corporation. The board of directors brought summary proceedings against the shareholder to recover
payment, insisting that the shareholder was precluded from raising the
implied warranty of habitability as a defense. 156 For a second time,
the court interpreted New York's statutory warranty of habitability as
being "explicit and inclusive" and applying to cooperatives. 157 The
court explained the inequity that would result from a contrary
holding:
An examination of the relationships in a housing cooperative
reveals that a minority shareholder is often as powerless against the
board of directors as any tenant vis-A-vis a landlord. In such a situation a tenant/cooperator cannot even obtain the advantages of a
tenant organization since the other tenants are, in effect, the landlord. To distinguish cooperative housing corporations from rental
housing entities for one purpose (warranties) and treat them identically for others (summary proceedings) may create the anomalous
situation where a tenant in a cooperative is subject to all of the58liabilities but none of the rights of a tenant in a rental building.1
The court was primarily motivated by a sense of fairness and equity
for cooperative shareholders, along with a desire to compensate for
the shareholders' lack of bargaining power with respect to their
boards of directors. Kenny placed cooperatives within the statutory
warranty not because it was a good fit, but because it was equitablel1 9-just as the Javins court felt it equitable to create the implied
warranty of habitability for renters. 6
Hauptman and Kenny set the stage for Suarez v. Rivercross Tenants'
Corp.,6' which has been cited as the primary authority concerning the
62
extension of the implied warranty of habitability to cooperatives.
Suarez, a shareholder, brought an action against his cooperative for
"breach of the lease terms as well as breach of the statutory duty to
supply heat. ' 163 In reviewing the trial court's denial of the parties'
motions for summary judgment, the Appellate Term's majority
quickly validated the lower court's decision and, in dictum, launched
155. 430 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Civ. Ct. 1980).
156. See id. at 238-39.
157. Id. at 239.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
161. 438 N.Y.S.2d 164 (App. Term 1981).
162. See Richard Siegler, Responsibilityfor Repairs in Co-ops and Condominiuns,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 21, 1984, at 1 ("The applicability of the implied warranty of habitability to cooperative apartments was affirmatively resolved by [the] 1981 decision of
[Suarez].").
163. Suarez, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
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into a justification for extending the statutory warranty of habitability
to cooperatives.' 64
The Suarez majority used the holdings of Shor, Hauptman, and

Kenny to justify its support for extending the statutory warranty of

habitability to cooperatives.' 65 It did not suggest the extension because cooperatives fit so perfectly within the parameters of the statute, but rather because it makes sense and is equitable. As the court
observed:
Whether the [statutory warranty of habitability] was intended to apply to the proprietary lessor-lessee situation. .. is ... not expressly
stated in the statute. Nevertheless, "It is not unprecedented in our
jurisprudence for language shaped by a particular purpose to be
found useful in responding to other problems," and as a matter of
sound policy the [cooperative shareholder] . . . should
166 enjoy
whatever benefits flow from the warranty of habitability.

While conceding that placing cooperatives within the gamut of the
statutory warranty is like "pounding square pegs in round holes," 67
the Suarez majority justified its manipulation of the statute by indicating that "the result should be ... an increased attention on the part of

cooperative boards68 of directors to the well-being of the members of

the cooperative.'

164. See id. ("While there are indeed fact issues that require a trial, this court cannot ignore the issue of whether or not the statute (RPL 235-b) applies to cooperative
apartments.").
165. See id. at 166-67.
166. Id at 167 (citation omitted). The court further noted that the cooperative
shareholder "is entitled to the statutory protection as well as the non-investing, ordinary tenant" Id
167. Id
168. Id. A concurring judge in Suarez was much more concerned about the majority's use of the statutory warranty in this situation. He suggested that it was intellec-

tually dishonest to include cooperatives in the statutory warranty:

There is little if any basis for concluding that the Legislature intended to
extend the application of [the statutory warranty] to the sui generis relationship which exists between the cooperative corporation and its shareholders ....
[I]t is nowhere stated in the statute . . . that the ameliorative
legislation was ever intended to apply to the proprietary lessor-lessee
situation.
Id at 169 (Asch, J., concurring). The judge reminded the majority that even if the
statutory warranty were not available to cooperative owners, the shareholders would
still have other legal tools to sustain an action against the cooperative corporation.
See id (Asch, J., concurring). Specifically, the fiduciary relationship that exists between a cooperative and its shareholders creates an arsenal of effective remedies
available to the cooperative owner (i.e., breach of fiduciary duty). See id. (Asch, J.,
concurring). For this reason, the judge doubted that "the Legislature considered it
necessary to further protect the cooperative shareholder through application" of the
statutory warranty of habitability. Id (Asch, J., concurring). While the judge did not
shut the door to the possibility of providing cooperative shareholders with a warranty
of habitability, he expressed his doubts regarding the wisdom of manipulating the
inflexible statutory warranty to include cooperatives. See id. at 169-70 (Asch, I.,
concurring).
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The majority also confronted one criticism of the extension: by applying the implied warranty of habitability to a shareholder, the court
is providing a remedy for the shareholder to sue himself and thus attack his own interests. In other words, "[T]here is thus created the
anomalous situation that one who is essentially an owner (by virtue of
his purchase of shares) is in a sense suing himself. ' 169 The court answered this challenge by drawing a parallel between the cooperative
shareholder and the shareholder of a major corporation: "No one
right
would deny the owner of shares of stock in General Motors the
70
to sue that corporation if he purchased a defective vehicle."'1
Undoubtedly, the statutory warranty of habitability is not a comfortable fit for anyone other than tenants. With some difficulty, the
statutory warranty has been stretched to encompass cooperatives.
Part III illustrates that the elasticity of the statutory warranty is at its
limits and suggests that, to maintain the doctrine's integrity while satisfying equity, it should be applied to condominiums via the common
law.
III.

EXTENDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY TO
CONDOMINIUMS VIA THE COMMON LAW

This part begins by analyzing the difficulties of extending the statutory warranty to condominiums. It then discusses the inequity in each
of the arguments used to deny condominium unit owners relief under
the warranty doctrine. A synthesis of these two perspectives demonstrates that the problem is not with the application of the warranty
doctrine to condominiums, but rather with the attempted application
of inflexible statutes intended for renter-tenants. Finally, this part
proposes that both law and equity are satisfied when the common law
is used to extend the warranty to condominiums.
A. Arguments Against the Extension of the Warranty
to Condominiums
Courts have developed various justifications for refusing to extend
the warranty of habitability to condominiums. First, courts have
pointed to their state legislatures' failure to specifically provide an implied warranty of habitability for condominiums.17 These courts re169. Id. at 167.
170. Id. Perhaps an even more powerful analogy can be drawn between coopera-

tive shareholders and shareholders of publicly held corporations that own and manage rental properties. An example of such a corporation is Avalon Bay Communities,
Inc., which is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. See Stock Tables, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 23, 1999, at Cl. It is unlikely that any court would hold that a shareholder of
Avalon Bay Communities, Inc., who was also a tenant at one of the corporation's
properties, would be barred from using the warranty of habitability on the basis that
he would be using it against his own "interests."
171. See, e.g., Pooser v. Lovett Square Townhomes Owners' Ass'n, 702 S.W.2d 226,
230 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the state Condominium Act does not mandate
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gard legislative silence as being dispositive on the warranty issue. As
one court has observed, "Had the Legislature intended to allow owners of condominium units to withhold assessments where owners believe that their condominium association is not performing its
obligations properly, we believe the Legislature would have explicitly
so provided."' 72
Along the same lines, some courts have found that, because condominium by-laws generally contain no provision that allows an owner
to withhold his maintenance fee payments when management fails to
maintain the common elements, the owner must continue to make
payments regardless of management's failure to act. 73 This rationale
embraces a contractual policy that "apartment owners in condominiums accept the terms, conditions, and restrictions in their Condominium Declaration
by acceptance of deeds to the individual apartment
' 74
units.'

1

Other courts have relied on the differing legal compositions of cooperatives and condominiums as a reason for declining to extend the
statutory warranty of habitability to condominiums. 75 Indeed, as one
court has noted, "While some superficial aspects of condominium and
cooperative ownership are similar, (e.g., the payment of monthly
charges for the maintenance of common areas), the two forms of interest in real property are fundamentally different by design and as a
matter of law."'1 76 Therefore, according to this reasoning, the fact that
the statutory warranty has been applied to cooperatives is irrelevant
with respect to condominiums.
that "the duty to pay assessments is contingent upon the obligation to repair common
elements").

172. Rivers Edge Condominium Ass'n v. Rere, Inc., 568 A.2d 261, 263 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1990) (citation omitted).
173. The Pooser court indicated that:
In fact, the declaration provides for no exemption whatsoever from payment
of the assessments, stating in pertinent part: "No Owner is or shall be exempt from such obligation to make such payment by waiver of use of the
Common Areas, or any portion thereof, or because of any restrictions of
such use pursuant to this Declaration, the By-Laws or the Rules and Regulations, or for any other reason."
Pooser,702 S.W.2d at 230.

174. Id. at 230-31 (citations omitted). See also Agassiz W. Condominium Ass'n v.
Solum, 527 N.W.2d 244, 247 (N.D. 1995) (noting that, under the condominium
owner's declaration and by-laws, an owner has no authority to "withhold assessments
for common charges for any reason"); Rere, 568 A.2d at 263 (observing that the by-

laws "explicitly require that a unit owner continue to pay the condominium assessment even if the owner is not receiving services owed to him, i.e., repairs to the common elements").
175. See Frisch v. Bellmarc Management, Inc., 597 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (App. Div.
1993); Solum, 527 N.W.2d at 246-47.

176. Frisdz, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 965. The Appellate Division issued this holding not
withstanding the lower court's observation that the "trend in case law has been to-

ward wider application of the [implied warranty of habitability's] protection." Id. (citing the lower court).
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Still another argument maintains that providing condominium unit
owners with an implied warranty of habitability offends good business
sense. 177 This argument contends that making the withholding of
maintenance payments illegal benefits all unit owners because if all
unit owners continue to pay their monthly fee, the board will be able
to cover the condominium's operating costs and make necessary repairs. 178 In other words, the extension of the implied warranty of habitability to condominiums would allow unit owners to sabotage the
condominium's operations and thus commit legal suicide.
B. Inequity of Arguments Refusing to Extend the Warranty
to Condominiums
Upon close examination, it becomes evident that each of the categorical arguments for not extending the warranty to condominiums is
inapplicable. Most of the concerns raised by courts that refuse to extend the warranty to condominiums have been answered by the Javins
legacy. This section examines these concerns.
1. Silence of the Legislature
The Javins court decided that while legislatures may not have explicitly created a warranty of habitability, they had passed housing
laws to promote habitable housing standards. 179 Thus, according to
Javins, a judicially-created implied warranty of habitability for rentertenants was in accordance with current legislative intent, 180 despite the
absence of a warranty of habitability statute, because the doctrine supported existing statutes' objective of maintaining habitable housing.18 '
Similarly, courts have applied some housing standards that legislatures
originally created for rental units to condominiums, because these
standards promote and ensure habitable housing, whatever legal form
the housing may take. 8 2 These holdings suggest that extending the
warranty of habitability to condominiums is not at odds with the legislative intent behind statutes that have already been enacted.
Pershadv. ParkchesterS. Condominium'83 is one court's interpretation that its state's legislature also intended to regulate the habitability
177. See Rere, 568 A.2d at 263.
178. See id.; cf. Suarez v. Rivercross Tenants' Corp., 438 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167 (App.
Term 1981) (discussing the anomalous situation of providing a cooperative shareholder with a remedy to use against his own interest).
179. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., Board of Managers v. Lamontanero, 616 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (App.
Div. 1994) (applying a "Pet Law," originally intended to protect renter-tenants, to
condominiums); Pershad v. Parkchester S. Condominium, 662 N.Y.S.2d 993, 995 (Civ.
Ct. 1997) (discussing the applicability of the Housing Maintenance Code created to
regulate rental housing to condominiums).
183. 662 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
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of condominiums. In Pershad,a condominium board claimed that a
housing court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over its dispute
with a unit owner, who asserted that the board had failed to make
necessary repairs to the common elements."s The board claimed that
the housing court was "restricted to the resolution of disputes be'1 5
tween a landlord and tenant and not a condominium unit owner."
The court disagreed, observing that the "function of the Housing
Court... [is the] protection and enforcement of state and local laws
for the establishment and maintenance of housing standards,"'" and
held that it did have subject matter jurisdiction over the case.1s7
The condominium board further argued that it was not subject to
New York's Housing Maintenance Code, because the code applied
only to landlords.s The court refused to accept this argument, finding that:
The definition of an owner under [the] Housing Maintenance Code
...includes any other person, firm or corporation, directly or indirectly in control of the building. Although this definition is extremely broad, there is a strong indication that it includes the
association, and its managing agent. A contrary interpretation is
clearly unrealistic. What party or agent would be responsible for
maintaining the pipes8 and
other areas of common elements other
9
than the association?1

The court noted that the Housing Maintenance Code has "already
been held to apply to residents of cooperative units," and it should
apply to condominiums as well. 19
The interpretation of the Pershadcourt is not a rogue holding, but
rather one that comports with common sense and precedent. 19' For
example, the New York Appellate Division has held that housing Administrative Code section 27-2009.1, known as the "Pet Law," applies
both to rental units and condominiums, 1' 2 despite the fact that the
' 93
Code "does not specifically include or exclude condominiums."'
The Appellate Division reasoned that because the code "is conceded
to apply to multiple dwellings that consist of rental apartments and it
has been applied to residential cooperative buildings," it should be
184. See id. at 995.
185. Id at 994.
186. Id at 996.
187. See i at 995.
188. See i.
189. Id
190. Id (citation omitted).
191. Cf. Smith v. Parkchester N. Condominium, 619 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (Civ. Ct.
1994) (indicating that "[a] common sense approach" requires a balancing of the Administrative Code and New York's statutory warranty of habitability).
192. See Board of Managers v. Lamontanero, 616 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (App. Div.
1994).
193. Id.
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extended to condominiums as well.' 94 In short, whether a state's warranty of habitability statute explicitly extends the warranty doctrine to
condominiums should not resolve this controversy.
2.

Contract Principles

One of the major motivating factors behind the creation of the warranty of habitability was the inequality of bargaining power between
landlords and tenants.' 95 Javins, like Pines and Brown before it, was
concerned that landlords required tenants to accept lease contracts on
a take it or leave it basis. 196 Tenants are usually in no position to
negotiate much of anything into a lease contract, let alone a warranty
of habitability.1 97 It is likely that many tenants are not even aware
that contract negotiations are an option. 198 This is why courts, as well
as the state legislatures that codified the warranty of habitability,
made the warranty unwaivable. 199 Thus, any contract provision that
restricts a tenant's action or defense for a breach of the warranty of
habitability is void.2°° This unwaivability ensures that there will always be a legal remedy available to a tenant when the disrepair of the
common elements makes his apartment uninhabitable."'
It is equally reasonable to assume that condominium unit owners do
not have any more bargaining power with respect to their condominium boards than tenants have with their landlords. Just as a tenant
accepts the terms of his lease, a unit purchaser accepts the terms of
the condominium's governing documents, including the by-laws, when
he accepts the deed to the unit.2" Negotiations to change the governing documents rarely occur. In fact, unit purchasers normally must
obtain the approval of the condominium board, so it is unlikely that a
unit purchaser would be anxious to "rock the boat."2 3
Tenants, cooperative owners, and condominium unit owners all
share a common bargained-for expectation that usually does not ap194. Id. (citations omitted).
195. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
197. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (documenting the
inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant).
198. Cf id. (discussing the landlord-tenant relationship).
199. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
("We need not consider the provisions of the written lease governing repairs since this
implied warranty of the landlord could not be excluded."); see also, e.g., N.Y. Real
Prop. Law § 235-b(2) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999) ("Any agreement by a lessee or
tenant of a dwelling waiving or modifying his rights as set forth in this section shall be
void as contrary to public policy.").
200. See N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b(2).
201. Cf.Javins, 428 F.2d at 1080 ("'[U]nless repairs ...were made by the landlord,
they would not be made by any one."' (quoting Altz v. Lieberson, 134 N.E. 703, 704
(N.Y. 1922))).
202. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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pear in their "housing contracts, ' '20 4 namely, that their monthly pay-

ments will be used to ensure that the common elements do not
adversely affect the habitability of their units. 205 The common elements usually are not any more accessible to the condominium unit
owner than they are to the tenant or the cooperative owner. 206 In

fact, most condominium by-laws have specific contract provisions that
20 7
prohibit unit owners from making repairs to the common elements.

Furthermore, courts have recognized that the condominium board's
duty to "maintain the premises in good repair under [legislative law] is
non-delegable." 20 8
When Javins created an implied warranty of habitability, it specifically made the warranty unwaivable, holding that it did not need to
"consider the provisions of the written lease governing repairs since
this... warranty of the landlord [cannot] be excluded." 209 Similarly,
neither the absence of an implied warranty within the condominium
by-laws nor a by-law provision contradicting the warranty's principles
should prevent a condominium unit owner from being able to invoke
the doctrine. As a result, extending the warranty of habitability to
condominiums would more accurately reflect the bargained-for expectations of the condominium unit owner.210
3.

The Dissimilarities of Condominiums and Cooperatives

Courts have extended the statutory warranty of habitability to cooperatives, citing the similarities between renter-tenants and coopera204. The term "housing contracts" is being used collectively here to represent the
lease, bylaws, and any other governing documents of a cooperative or condominium.
205. Cf. supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing maintenance fees).
206. See, eg., Smith v. Parkchester N. Condominium, 619 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (Civ.
Ct. 1994) ("It is undisputed that [the unit owner] has no control over the common
areas/elements that would enable him to correct the violations found by the Housing
Inspector.").
207. See, e.g., Agassiz W. Condominium Ass'n v. Solum, 527 N.W.2d 244,247 (N.D.
1995) ("[The] bylaws . . . do not authorize [the unit owvners] to repair common
areas.").

208. Pershad v. Parkchester S. Condominium, 662 N.Y.S.2d 993, 995 (Civ. Ct.
1997).
209. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
210. Because Javins was primarily concerned wvith the empowerment of low-income, urban tenants, one could argue that the warranty of habitability should not be
made available to cooperative and condominium owners who are financially capable
of purchasing their units. But this argument fails to consider that courts have held
that the implied warranty of habitability safeguards habitable housing at every income
level. See Park W. Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1292-93 (N.Y.
1979). For evidence of the need for the implied warranty of habitability at every
income level, see Dennis Hevesi, Tempest in a Penthouse Has Legal Fees Soaring and
Agencies Entangled, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 5, 1998, at B3, which reported that the New
York City Department of Housing discovered 153 housing code violations in an apartment that cost a cooperative shareholder $1.5 million.

3068

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

tive shareholders.2 11 Some courts, however, have refused to extend
the warranty to condominiums on the ground that, unlike cooperative
shareholders, condominium unit owners are not analogous to rentertenants.2 a2 But the only legal similarity between tenants and cooperative owners is that they both occupy their respective units under a
lease. This link between tenants and cooperative owners becomes
even more tenuous when one considers that the issuance of shares and
a proprietary lease under a corporation is only one legal form that can
be used to create a cooperative. 1 3 On the other hand, aside from the
fact that the cooperative owner holds shares and a proprietary lease
while the condominium unit owner holds a deed, 214 many similarities
exist between the two owners. The histories of the cooperative and
condominium parallel one another.2 1 5 Both forms of ownership were
spurred by the need to utilize limited real estate in a more efficient
manner. 26 Condominiums and cooperatives are simply hybrids of the
same type of ownership interest: ownership of an apartment or residential unit. 17
Courts have extended the warranty of habitability to cooperatives
because it is equitable and there is a legal technicality that allows
them to do so, namely, that the cooperative owner possesses a
lease. 18 In addition, courts have recognized that a cooperative owner
relies on his board of directors for the same reason a tenant relies on
his landlord: to maintain the common elements that affect the habitability of the units.2 1 9 Clearly, the reliance of condominium and cooperative owners on their boards of directors is strikingly similar.
4.

Legal Suicide

Some have argued that extending the warranty of habitability to
cooperatives and condominiums forces owners to sabotage themselves
and their fellow owners by committing "legal suicide. ' 2 20 Another argument correctly asserts that, with or without the extension of the
warranty to condominiums, condominium owners have other legal
remedies to use against their boards of directors (i.e., breach of fiduci211. See generally supra Part II.C (discussing the application of the statutory warranty of habitability to cooperatives).
212. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part I.A.3.
215. Compare Romney & Romney, supra note 52, at 1-4 (discussing the history of
condominiums), with Ross, supra note 134, at 352 (discussing the history of
cooperatives).
216. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
217. See supra Part I.B.
218. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
219. See Hauptman v. 222 E. 80th St. Corp., 418 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (Civ. Ct. 1979).
220. Cf Suarez v. Rivercross Tenants' Corp., 438 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167 (App. Term
1981) (indicating that in the context of cooperatives "there is thus created the anomalous situation that one who is essentially an owner ... is in a sense suing himself").
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ary duty)." 2 This illustrates the weakness of the "legal suicide" argument against the extension of the warranty, because condominium
owners already possess the capability to commit "legal suicide."
Maintenance fee abatements by cooperative owners can be far
more detrimental than abatements by condominium owners. 22 The
cooperative maintenance fee is not only used to maintain the common
elements, but also to pay the underlying mortgage on the property
and its taxes.' Furthermore, if the cooperative corporation goes insolvent, the property is foreclosed upon, and the shareholders' proprietary leases are rendered void.' 4 Even with such grave consequences
hanging in the balance, however, our legal system demands that the
decision to take such potentially drastic action should be left to the
aggrieved party. 225
It is patronizing to suggest that a legal remedy should not be extended to a condominium unit owner based on the premise that he
may use it to commit "legal suicide." The implied warranty of habitability is a potent weapon that motivates parties responsible for the
maintenance of habitability to fulfill their obligation. Even if the condominium board of directors has delegated the maintenance of the
common elements to a managing agent, the board is ultimately responsible for the fiscal and physical condition of the condominium 226
Furthermore, the board of directors, not the individual condominium
unit owner, has the right to bring an action against the managing agent
for failing to maintain the common elements in accordance with the
management contract. 227
The extension of the warranty of habitability to condominiums provides unit owners with a powerful, unwaivable remedy that spurs adherence to habitability standards. The "legal suicide" argument did
not block the extension of the implied warranty of habitability to cooperatives, and in a legal system that empowers aggrieved parties, it
should not prevent the extension of the warranty doctrine to condomiiums. As both cooperative shareholders and condominium unit
owners may have other remedies available to them, the extension of
the warranty of habitability to condominiums and cooperatives does
not create an action where one previously did not exist. The addition
221. See, e.g., Agassiz W. Condominium Ass'n v. Solum, 527 N.W.2d 244,247 (N.D.
1995) (holding that the state condominium code "authorizes 'an aggrieved unit owner'
to bring an action for damages or injunctive relief for failure to comply with the con-

dominium's by-laws").
222. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.

223. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

225. The Suarez majority indicated that shareholders have the freedom to sue
against their own interests when they wage a class action suit. See supra notes 169-70
and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
227. The contractual relationship is between the board of directors and the manag-

ing agent. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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of the unwaivable action simply encourages "an increased attention
on the part of... boards of directors to the well-being of the members
of the cooperative [and condominium]." 228 It also helps to ensure that
the minimum standards for the habitability of housing are met.229 In
short, the extension furthers all of the equitable goals established by
the Javins court.230
C. An Alternative Method of Extending the Warranty
Undoubtedly, it is evident that condominiums are not a comfortable
fit within current warranty statutes which were originally intended for
23
renters. Indeed, it is like "pounding square pegs in round holes" '
and the integrity of the statute is arguably jeopardized when it is
manipulated to include condominiums. The solution, therefore, is not
to pigeonhole condominiums into warranty statutes, but to extend the
warranty through common law.
Courts can create common law so long as it does not conflict with
the legislative intent behind presently enacted statutes.232 The fact
that housing standards originally intended for renter-tenants have
been applied to condominiums 23 3 indicates that a judicial extension of
the implied warranty of habitability to condominiums would compliment current legislative intent, not undermine it. 34 When the Javins
court created an implied warranty of habitability at common law
where one previously did not exist,235 it did not contradict existing
statutes; it simply went outside of the statutes' inflexible structures to
meet the needs of modern society. 3 6 Instead of being shackled by the
lack of explicit statutes, Javins, along with those courts that followed
its precedent, stimulated the creation of the very statutes that were
lacking." 7 Statutory warranties do not specifically exclude condominiums; they simply do not make their inclusion explicit. 238 Therefore,
no legislative prohibition exists to prevent courts from extending the
warranty of habitability to condominiums. Simply because state legis228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Suarez v. Rivercross Tenants' Corp., 438 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167 (App. Term 1981).
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
Suarez, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 167.
See id.
See, e.g., Board of Managers v. Lamontanero, 616 N.Y.S.2d 744 (App. Div.

1994) (applying housing codes originally intended for renter-tenants to condominiums); Pershad v. Parkchester S. Condominium, 662 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Civ. Ct. 1997)
(same); Smith v. Parkchester N. Condominium, 619 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Civ. Ct. 1994)
(same).
234. Cf. Curry v. New York City Hous. Auth., 430 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (App. Div.

1980) ("It is not unprecedented in our jurisprudence for language shaped by a particular purpose to be found useful in responding to other problems.")
235. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999) (making no reference to condominiums).

1999]

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

3071

latures have not revisited their statutory warranties for two or three
decades does not mean that the courts cannot revisit the common law
and update the doctrine. After all, "[c]ourts have a duty to reappraise
old ,doctrines
in the light of the facts and values of contemporary
23 9
life.

Further, when the warranty is applied through the common law
rather than a statute, the differing legal compositions of condominiums and cooperatives become irrelevant. Although courts have chosen to extend the warranty of habitability statutorily to cooperatives

because the wording of the statutes allow them to do so, common law
can be used just as effectively to extend the warranty of habitability to
condominiums. The legal technicality that a condominium owner
does not hold a lease should not be the determinative factor on
whether the warranty is extended to condominiums. What should be
considered is whether the extension of the warranty to condominiums
makes sense, fits within the legislative intent of current statutes, and is
equitable.2'
CONCLUSION

The implied warranty of habitability was a revolutionary alteration

of antiquated common law property concepts, created in response to
the pressing concerns of modern standards of housing and habitability. It was applied to tenants to address their lack of bargaining
power, to meet their bargained-for expectations of habitable living
conditions, and to encourage the maintenance of the habitability
within multiple dwellings. The warranty was further extended to cooperative owners because courts recognized that these owners depended on their boards of directors to perform the same role as that
of a landlord: maintenance of the common elements to ensure the
habitability of each unit. The next logical step in the evolution of the
warranty is to apply it to condominiums.
Extending the common law warranty to condominiums is a small
feat compared to the undertakings of Javins. Courts must not delay
until their state legislatures decide to revisit their respective statutory
warranties of habitability. Indeed, many courts have recognized that
they should not wait for legislation to advance sound, equitable policies that they have an opportunity to effectuate immediately. Courts
can meet these objectives without manipulating unyielding statutes by
using common law that is consistent with current legislative intent.
After all, if the common law had not stirred legislatures to take initial
action on the implied warranty of habitability thirty years ago, it is
unclear what the state of landlord-tenant law would be today.
239. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
240. Cf.Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (Haw. 1969) (stating that, in the context of the landlord-tenant law, "an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for
the purposes intended is ...just and necessary").
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